Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are a set of legal regimes of a broad scope that range from patents that protect inventions, to copyrights, which relate to original forms of expression such as literary and artistic work, and, among others, trademarks that protect words and symbols that identify goods and services. IPRs confer an exclusive (and in the case of patents and copyright, temporary) right to the exploitation and commercialization of intangible assets 1 . Therefore, the IP regime establishes an institutional framework to manage access, exploitation and transfer of knowledge, technology and information. In the last decade, the emergence of new technological paradigms -mainly Information and Communication Technology (ICTs), biotech and nanotech, the re-shaping of world IP systems and the explosion in patenting -lead much of contemporary attention of scholars, policy makers and civil society to focus on the relationship between intellectual property and development.
A complete analysis of the changes in IP regimes and their impact on the rate and direction of inventive activity goes beyond the scope of this chapter; here we would like to stress the connection between IP regimes and industrial development. Evidence shows that IP regimes usually convolve with production transformations, as pulled by the production side. Frontier countries, particularly the US, strategically use IP regimes as mechanisms to protect certain accumulated capabilities of national production and research agents. Business methods and genetic engineering are research fields of growing importance in the US, and are sectors in which national research centers and enterprises already possess a considerable relative advantage. There is nothing accidental in the public authorities' decision to preserve national dominance in those fields by means of patent protection. This is a de facto industrial policy, aiming at preserving comparative advantages in given technological trajectories for certain economic agents. IP laws are mechanisms to preserve dominant positions in given fields, not mechanisms to create them.
Our thesis is that asymmetries in technological capacities (between firms and countries) are likely to persist over rather long periods of time, beyond the legal mechanisms defying the appropriability and transferability conditions of technologies. As regards the behavioral foundations of innovative and imitative activities, we are quite skeptical about their reduction to linear and deliberate profit maximizing choices. "Getting the IPRs right" is not an optimal solution for fostering industrial development and catching up. Legal appropriability mechanisms, i.e. prevailing intellectual property norms, classify as second order effect factors, with respect to production and technological capabilities in shaping innovative and imitative conducts. The analysis of TRIPS' flexibilities shows that any use of existing policy space is subject to decisions that go beyond the pure IP domain and that concern trade, industrial and technology policy issues. No flexibility will be used simply because it is legally feasible -national policies and priorities shape market and non market incentives and transform legal feasibility into action.
Frontier countries have been using and use IP as a de facto industrial policy measure to sustain the competitiveness of their industries and to protect dynamic advantages in certain technological trajectories. Developing countries should learn from them and strategically fine-tune IP regimes according to their industrial development needs. This chapter, far from being an exhaustive analysis, serves as a road map for analyzing the relationship between intellectual property and industrial development, in the light of pubic policy perspective.
In the first section we analyze the changes introduced in the US IP system beginning in the 1980s and the consequent reconfiguration of international IP regimes. In this respect, we present a taxonomy of TRIPS's flexibilities and a synthetic analysis of TRIPS "extra" and "plus" provisions included in recent bilateral trade agreements, analyzing the relationship between industrial development strategies and IP management. Next, we examine the dynamics of patenting, stressing the relationship between IP and production structure specialization. On that basis, we present an analysis of current markets for knowledge, exploring potential participation in and exclusion from in those markets for developed and developing countries. An overview of current IP dilemmas and the analysis of the relationship between production structure and IP management are necessary steps in defining a strategic approach to industrial development. The paper concludes stressing the importance of including IP issues into the renewed debate on policies and institutions shaping industrial development, avoiding incurring oversimplified IP for development agendas.
The reshaping of intellectual property regimes
Intellectual property regimes are, as all economic and legal institutions, context and time specific, and they are subject to change. In terms of evolution of intellectual property rights, if a lesson can be derived from history, it is that systems evolved as pulled by the production side.
When, in a given country, the introduction of IP protection could bring about a pecuniary gain in a given sector or area, the system was adapted, or a negotiation initiated to grant the right of appropriation of the relative rent. In contrast, sectors, lobbies (and countries) attempted to block the introduction of IP protection in cases in which they were net importers of the product or service in question 2 .
The transformation of intellectual property regimes has gone hand in hand with the different phases of development of modern economies 3 . Intellectual property systems have evolved from regulations of national scope, which prevailed during the "inward" stage of development of early industrializers, towards regimes of supranational scope. This transformation has taken place as foreign trade and interaction among countries have become more necessary and more frequent; as different technological paradigms emerged, increasing articulation and diversification of production processes, thus augmenting the relevance of knowhow, technical information, knowledge and the consequent value of their appropriability.
However, since the 1980s, there has been a radical reshaping in the management and the structure of IP regimes at the global level. Such changes are occurring in a context of growing trade integration and in a system of open economies, where trade liberalization has been coupled with pressures to strengthen intellectual property rights on an international scale.
In this regard, the changes in intellectual property regimes concern two different, although related, domains: (a) the modification of prevailing norms and the generation of a new set of incentives deriving from jurisprudential rulings within the US system, and (b) the increasing relevance of intellectual property in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations and in international disputes between countries. In this respect, the adoption of the TRIPS agreement in 1994 marked a mile stone in the big push towards the homogenization of IP minimum standards of protection.
A new set of incentives in the US IP laws and the "American preference"
Beginning in the 1980s, intellectual property protection has been (deliberately) intensified, in the United States through various channels: extension of patentable subject matter, extended time protection and increased target of subjects who can exert intellectual property rights. Subsequent to these changes, there has been an upsurge in patenting activity. A deep analysis of these issues goes beyond the scope of this chapter 4 , it suffices here to recall two major changes: a) the extension of patent subject matter and b) the Bayh-Dole act, and to highlight their use as (informal or de facto industrial policy) mechanisms to support technological development in national research centers and firms.
The extension of patentable subject matter
According to the US law, "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent…" 5 . Nowadays in the US, the most probable answer to the question, "Can I patent that?" is likely to be yes, as Hunt (2001) argues in his critical paper on the introduction of patents for business methods in the US economy. The above-mentioned relaxation of patentability criteria, due to some Supreme Court rulings, led to an extension of the patentable subject matter. In fact, US firms increasingly use patents to protect physical inventions as well as more abstract ones, such as computer programs or business models and methods 6 .
According to US jurisprudential tradition, laws of nature, and hence mathematical formulas, could not be the subjects of a patent (cf. Gottschalk vs Benson, 1972 (Shapiro, 2001 ).
The extension of the patentable domain also involved living entities. The 1980 Diamond vs Chakrabarty Supreme Court decision stated that "a live, human made micro-organism is patentable subject matter" 9 , paving the way for a series of rulings which led to the patentability of partial genes sequences (ESTs 10 ), including genes crucial to treating illnesses (Orsi 2002) .
Another decision worth mentioning is Re Brana 1995. This ruling established the presumption of utility and reversed the jurisprudence that supported the circumspect practice of the USPTO in granting patents in this field. Re Brana recognizes the validity on patent claims on discoveries not yet made or not yet materialized.
In the US patent law, "utility" is an essential criterium for patentability. "Utility" refers to the industrial and commercial advances, "useful arts", enabled by the invention. Relaxing the meaning of "utility" transforms non-patentable subject matters into patentable ones. Again, the guaranteeing an upstream protection of the "research product," which results in the right to exclude rival firms from benefiting from "basic" discoveries (Coriat and Orsi, 2002) . The resulting fear is that the system is moving toward the dissipation of the traditional "open science"
paradigm . The new regime covers, areas for software and living entities, key inputs, research tools and raw materials for other areas of innovation (Arrow, 1962; Shapiro, 2001 ). In a context in which innovation is increasingly cumulative in nature, the progressive enclosure 13 of technical knowledge, which is at the basis for subsequent advancements in science and innovation, may induce a sort of "lock-out" of potential innovators that are not yet in a dominant position, or, on the contrary, may give excessive bargaining power to small, technology-intensive firms with no physical processing or distribution capacity.
A complete analysis of the changes in the US IP law and their impact on the rate and direction of inventive activity is beyond the scope of this paper, however, we would like to stress the connection between the reshaping of IP regimes and the dynamics of research and industrial development in the US. Business methods and genetic engineering are research fields of growing importance in the US, and are sectors in which national research centers and enterprises already possess a considerable relative advantage. There is nothing accidental in the public authorities' decision to restrict access to a discovery in order to preserve it by means of patent protection in those fields. This is clearly a de facto industrial policy, intended to preserve comparative advantages in given technological trajectories for certain economic agents.
The Bayh-Dole Act
The inclusion of provisions that allow granting patents through exclusive licenses only to US manufacturing firms, as it is stated in section 204 of the Bayh Dole Act, which sets the conditions for the "American industry preference", responds to the same de facto industrial policy strategy. In 1980, the US Congress adopted the Bayh-Dole Act, which is embedded in title Dasgupta and David (1994) emphasize the fact that this appropriation of knowledge is achieved through a series of "bilateral monopolies" that universities and public laboratories share with private for-profit organizations, thus contributing to the commoditization of research outcomes (Eisenberg, 2000; Orsi, 2002) .
The literature stressed the fact that this act introduced a fundamental shift in the way in which patenting is justified. In incentives theory, the inventor's "reward" justification fades since, as Mazzoleni and Nelson (2000) noted, the invention is made with federal financial assistance, hence inventors receive an a priori reward. The rewarding function of the patent weakens when the inventor is the beneficiary of financial assistance. In contrast, shifts in the US patent system introduced a different (and new) type of incentive: the inducement to transfer from public research to marketable products, favoring the appropriation of research results to firms that have not been engaged in fundamental research. Firms are induced, through the benefit of exclusive licenses, to commercialize outcomes of publicly funded research even before those outcomes are obtained. In this respect Mazzoleni and Nelson (2000) discuss an "induced commercialization theory". Patents no longer reward the inventor ex post -instead, the ex-ante reward transmogrifies the patent's status from an exploitation right to an exploration right.
The extension of patents' domain and the 1980 Bayh-Dole act modified the academyenterprise links in knowledge generation and diffusion. From 1991 to 2000 patents applications from universities grew about 240%. In reality, the "public nature" of basic knowledge is shifting towards the private and club goods domain, where access is ruled by market mechanisms. The
Bayh-Dole Act, especially paragraph 204, reversed the previous system under which free access to basic research outcomes was granted equally to all firms that profited differently from the available knowledge pool depending on their specific assets and capabilities.
However, beyond the debate on access and commercialization of knowledge, there is an additional provision, scantly addressed by the literature, which we believe deserves consideration: the "preference for the United States industry" stated in section 204 of the BayhDole Act, according which, the right to patent and sell discoveries as exclusive licenses does not apply "unless ... any product embodying the subject invention or product through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States" 15 . In this way, intellectual property management has entered clearly the domain of strategic industrial and trade policy 16 . Exclusive licenses of outcomes of inventions made with federal assistance are, with no surprise, strategically reserved to US industries. Moreover, this "preference" is granted as early as the exploration phase, helping to create entry barriers to foreign firms. The US administration seems to deliberately provide domestic firms with an opportunity to develop a whole set of legally guaranteed rents, even before the investment in R&D took place, thus reverting the traditional patent logic of rewarding a prior effort ex post. A virtual rent market at bargain basement prices is being setting up for American companies 17 .
Internationalization of IP protection and management
The use of IP mechanisms as strategic tools for promoting industrial and technological development also characterizes international IP management. Historically, the territorial scope of intellectual property protection extended through time from national boarders to the international arena as international trade increased and economies became interdependent 18 . According to these principles, each WTO member is required to treat nationals of other member states at least as well as its own nationals, and to treat all other member states on an equivalent basis in relation to the protection of intellectual property. TRIPS resulted in the expansion and the strengthening of IPRs, thus pushing for foreign countries' establishing a system that reflects the priorities of the US regime.
The adoption of TRIPS raised concerns regarding its implications for developing countries including the risks of homogenizing IP systems among countries with asymmetric technological capabilities and at different development stages 21 . For the purposes of this chapter, it suffices to recall some basic features of this agreement and highlight the relationship between its provisions and industrial development. Though the interest today has shifted from the multilateral to the bilateral level, it is worth identifying some (although scant) flexibilities that exist in the TRIPS agreement and to identify the effective policy spaces which might allow countries to strategically use IP management according to their industrial development priorities.
In fact, TRIPS includes some special and differential treatment provisions and flexibilities that might be used to pursue industrial development objectives (See Table 19 .1 for a taxonomy of flexibilities and effective policy spaces allowed by TRIPS). Second, Article 31 establishes the conditions under which the governments of member states are allowed to issue a compulsory license. A government may authorize a party other than the patent holder of an invention to use that invention, even without the consent of the patent holder, when that party has unsuccessfully tried to obtain such a license on "reasonable commercial terms within a reasonable period of time". I conditions under which it is possible to issue a compulsory license restrict the potential use of this flexibility, being difficult to fulfill and subject to subjective interpretation of "reasonable". However, the quite restrictive a priori effort requirement does not apply in the cases of national emergencies, extreme urgency and public non-commercial use.
Developing countries make scant use of compulsory licensing, because of its restrictions as well as serious industrial limitations. In the case of pharmaceuticals, most developing countries lack the know-how and the production and technological capabilities to carry out the reverse engineering. In many cases, a lack of market incentives precludes use of this flexibility in absence of a more long term industrial policy supporting their engagement in such productive effort 22 . (Basheer, 2005) . Canada and Rwanda recently exploited this space for Triavir, an HIV drug. Further, Thailand, soon followed by Brazil, recently issued compulsory licenses to produce some key drugs for the treatment of the HIV pandemic.
Third, Parallel imports, which refer to the different exhaustion regimes of patent protection (national, regional or international), are products purchased in one market and subsequently sold on a second market without the authorization of the right holder. Thus, prior to a patent's expiration, countries can take advantage of products manufactured under license in other countries or for other markets and profit from international price differentials. Developing countries make scant use of this mechanism, in part due to the lack of qualified technical personnel and institutional apparatus needed to carry out this practice. Further, this policy space is at risk as banning parallel imports is often a pre-requisite for entering into a bilateral trade negotiation with the US.
Finally, Article 30 of TRIPS established the "exceptions to rights conferred". Member countries "may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties". In the cautious language of TRIPS, this article recognizes the right to provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent, including the Bolar exception, also known as "early working", which allows generic producers to import, manufacture and carry out experiments on patented products before the patent expires. In other words, it allows firms to carry out experimental R&D to produce generic products without violating the patent. Certain thresholds of technological and production capacities, as well as public and private incentives to engage in such research efforts, are needed to engender a demand for using this flexibility, and most developing countries lack the first, i.e. the production capacities, or the second, i.e. the incentives and the appropriate sets of policies. Thus, the US benefits from the unilateral right of reprisal against countries that are deemed as denying adequate and effective protection to US firms' IPRs, even when these countries are complying with international agreements in this area. In particular, the right of the USTR to undertake unilateral action ensues when an "unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory" behavior is detected in trading partners. Paradoxically it can happen that, according to Bayard and Eliot, an action is deemed "unreasonable" when it appears to be "inequitable and unfair in some way or another, even if it does not necessarily violate the United States' international rights, or even if it isn't incompatible with them" (Bayard and Eliot, 1994) .
In 2005, the USTR declared that the US was "committed to a policy of promoting increased intellectual property protection" and that it will use "all statutory tools to improve intellectual property protection in countries where it is inadequate" in order to protect its industries. Even though the policy language has softened in the last three years, the US still makes no mystery of its strategy for securing fair and equitable market access for US products.
"This Administration is committed to using all available methods to resolve IPR related issues and ensure that market access is fair and equitable for U.S. products (…), requiring authorized 
national firms).
A shift in the US trade diplomacy (Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005) focuses now on bilateral trade and investment agreements, which reduce many of the flexibilities that were available in TRIPS 27 , especially including TRIPS extra and plus provisions 28 . The strategic protection of US industry through different channels has been at the hub of the US approach towards development and competitiveness. For example, free trade agreements (FTAs) extend patent terms beyond the 20 years established by TRIPS by introducing extensions for delays caused by the regulatory approval process or delays in the patent granting process itself. This is particularly relevant in the case of pharmaceuticals because, as the process for approval of marketing a new drug can last years, patent protection can be extended far beyond the standard 20-year term 29 . In certain cases, the requirement of novelty is relaxed, and patenting of new uses for existing products is allowed. FTAs also restrict TRIPS' flexibilities, often used as a means to ban parallel imports (Maskus and Chen, 2002) . Usually, FTAs include provisions which create obstacles to compulsory licensing, such as the requirement to obtain the consent of the patent holder to market a generic drug before patent expiration and the data test exclusivity.
In bilateral agreements, "intangibles" seem to be the counterweight for "tangibles".
Developing countries engage in these negotiations seeking privileged market access for their products (especially agricultural and textiles) and concede on the US request on IP. This is a risky business for a number of reasons. First, bilateral FTA IP provisions raise welfare concerns because they affect key issue such as public health, as many relate to the pharmaceutical industry and generic production of patented drugs. Further, the advantages of the privileged market access will tend to decrease as more countries enjoy that privilege. Finally, other restrictive IP regimes reinforce the technological dominance of frontier economies, hampering the structural change required to develop new products and processes for which enjoying preferential market access could really make the difference.
The US monitoring activity and negotiating strategy are empowered by the threat of reprisals and the counterweight concessions in other areas of international trade 30 . Though the various activities are formally labeled as trade policy intended to foster competition and free trade, it is evident that these instruments are tailored to maintain the competitiveness of national firms in given priority sectors. Hence again, IP issues enter into the de facto industrial policy space. This might be legitimate from the point of view of the US, but from that of developing countries? The US strategically manages all policy space in order to defend its national interest and "prefers" its industries. Developing countries, in turn, often appear to prioritize blaming the aggressive US attitude over designing and implementing industrial policies to strengthen the economic and academic actors, or in pursuing myopic negotiating strategies privileging static comparative advantages, rather than dynamic ones, adversely affecting long-term industrial development.
Identifying the changes in IP management within the US system and at the international level is only the first step in proposing a pragmatic development agenda capable of going beyond good intentions and declarations. Clarifying the relationship between patenting and production structure specialization and recognizing that the rationale for patenting is moving away from the traditional interpretation of markets for technologies are the necessary next steps.
The relationship between production structure specialization and patenting
Patenting has intensified in the last decades. Year after year, patent offices receive a growing number of applications, and they are granting more patents. In the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the number of granted patents exponentially increased since the 1960s, showing a remarkable jump in 1998; in 2006 the USPTO granted 173,771 utility patents 31 .
The increase in patenting activity is registered occuring globally. Though the leading economies in terms of technological and industrial capabilities still are major players, activity had also intensified in emerging economies and developing countries, paving the way for a reconfiguration of the traditional knowledge club. Nevertheless, the three major patent offices remain in North America, Japan and Europe, which collectively have the highest share of patents at the global level 32 .
According to USPTO data the United States, Japan and Germany accounted for almost 80% of total granted patents in the USPTO since the 1970s. Nevertheless, when considering the total number of patents granted in the United States to non-residents, we note that whereas in the 1960s the three main countries were Germany, England and France, which had 58.8% of the total patents issued to non-residents, in 2003 the three main stakeholders were Japan, Germany and the Chinese province of Taiwan, which accounted for 67.3% of total patent granted to non residents. If we consider the five major patenting economies, excluding the US, we note that, from the 1970s, Taiwan and Korea replaced France and Canada.
This sorpasso is not surprising given the structural changes experienced by those countries. In the last few decades those economies have radically transformed their production structures by intensifying their specialization in knowledge-intensive sectors (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Jomo, 1997; Cimoli et al., 2005) . The combination of selective industrial, technological and trade policies in support of domestic industries and the gradual opening-up to foreign trade as production sectors achieved international competitiveness had generated the technological capacities that lie at the root of the intensification of patenting activity. In fact, once a production system has been transformed into a knowledge generator and disseminator, patents become necessary in order to appropriate the rents stemming from innovative efforts.
Despite the patenting dynamism of emerging countries, the knowledge club persists. The
North-South asymmetry in the dynamics of patenting activities corresponds to the North-South asymmetry in technological intensity of production structures and specialization patterns. That is, countries' participation in world patenting depends on the dynamics of their production structures and their processes of structural change.
Developing countries spend few financial resources in R&D 33 , as they are in general specialized in low knowledge intensive activities, especially natural resources and labor intensive industries, and their domestic innovation efforts are basically adaptive in nature and rarely encompass inventions and scientific discoveries. Consequently their patenting activity is scarce.
In contrast, industrialized countries are more specialized in knowledge and technology intensive sectors and they invest more resources in R&D; it therefore comes as no surprise that they are also leaders in number of patents applied for and granted (Aboites and Cimoli, 2002; Cimoli, 2005; Montobbio, 2006) 34 .
R&D efforts do not depend exclusively on the specialization pattern, but a minimum efficient scale of industries specializing in key sectors is a precondition for generating a system that is willing to invest in R&D. The specialization pattern and R&D efforts are, on in turn, related to patenting activity. It seems to be a self-reinforcing circle: those who specialize in more technology intensive sectors display more patent-intensive activity and, of course, host the more relevant patenting offices.
Contrary to the argument championed by the TRIPS' advocates, stronger and homogeneous patent regimes did have accelerated the pace of innovation in developing countries. Asymmetry between developed and developing countries in patenting activity, reflecting diverging specialization structures, also emerges when considering who patents in given sectors. In the USPTO, patents in the electronics-related sectors show the highest dynamism during the 1990s, correlated to the information technology revolution. Ranking countries according to their technological production capacities and to their innovative performance helps to clarify our point. In Figure 19 .1 we order countries along the horizontal axis according to the intensity of their technological specialization with respect to the frontier (which in this case is proxyed by the US). At the same time, we measure their patenting activity: for each country or group of countries, we plot on the vertical axis the cumulative share of all patents applied for at the three major world-patenting offices (Europe, Japan and North America).
The figure portrays what we call a knowledge curve, showing the comparative technological intensity of production structures of countries and their relative patenting behavior. First, we observe a clear differentiation between industrialized and industrializing countries. The US, Japan, Canada, Emerging Asia and the European countries all show similar production structures as regards the share of technology intensive sectors within total manufacturing value added. The share of those sectors varies between 45% for the average of European countries considered and 65% in the US. Asian countries were successful in fostering the development of technology intensive industries by combining selective import substitution policies with an aggressive export oriented strategy (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990 Jomo, 1997 .
On the contrary, in Latin America and in most African countries, the opening-up process of the Participation and exclusion in the (new) markets for knowledge 36 When The Economist entitled its special issue "A market for ideas" on October, 20 th 2005, it was clear that firms (and countries) were facing a reconfiguration of traditional markets for technologies, and that patents were moving away from their usual domain of "temporary monopolies" granted to inventions with industrial applicability.
According to the literature, when the right to produce some artifact, or the knowledge and the know-how required to produce it are clearly separated from the product or the service they are destined to produce, a line emerges between the market for tangibles and the market for the technologies necessary to produce them (Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001 ).
The idea of markets for technologies implies that there are firms that are specialized in providing technologies and enterprises able -and wiling -to use these technologies to produce and sell artifacts to consumers. In this view, patents allows for specialization and division of labor between technology providers and users, fostering efficiency in markets for technology.
The primary function of this market is to favor the diffusion and the transferability of innovation through licensing. The value of patents mainly derives from its usability in tangible production, and it is strictly related to the subjacent technology.
A number of studies show the growing importance of patents and the increase in the use of technology licenses in transfers, acquisitions and cross-licensing among companies Thurow, 1997; Grandstrand, 1999; Guellec, Martínez and Sheenan, 2004) 5.00 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Share of royalties and licenses fees receipts in total exports of goods and services 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Share of royalties and licenses payments in to imports of goods and services (BoP, Current US$)
Poly oyalties and ses fees receipts (payments) as percentage of total exports (imports) of goods and services.
In the early 1970s, the US accounted for 80% of world receipts for royalties and licenses fees, followed by the UK with 12%. In 2005, 46% of world receipts for royalties and licenses fees accrue to the US, followed by Japan with 14% and the UK with 12%. Knowledge supply is more concentrated than knowledge demand, meaning that there are more countries that increasingly demand knowledge than countries that supply it, but this is not extraordinary: as a matter of fact knowledge production is sticky. As economies develop they are likely to extend their knowledge demand more rapidly than their capacity to produce it. In 2005, we must include 12 countries in order to reach the 80% of global demand for knowledge . However, the importance of technology markets and the increase in worldwide transactions of intangible goods explain only some of the dynamics related to the recent explosion in patenting and the new according to which publicly funded research was supposed to increase the pool of available knowledge, since the "filter" to use and exploit this knowledge rested on technological and production capacities of agents, routines and tacit knowledge beyond any legal effort to protect it (Rai, 2001, Dasgupta and Mowery et al. 2004 ). This market results in an anterior market, to which firms have to revert when results of universities research are subject to This market is liquid in the sense that patents are easily tradable without requiring firms to have the necessary technological and production capacities to translate the invention into practice (at the time of transaction). Patents "monetize" because they loose the weight and the density of the technological component and they easily "circulate" without having to be necessarily entangled in any final artifact. At the same time, a given share of patents is not evenly traded and it remains dormant. Just as in derivative financial markets the value of the transaction is disentangled from the present value of the share object of transaction, in this case patents are valued according to their potential future value. The decision to patent goes beyond the expectation of incorporating the patented invention into (direct or indirect) production. Firms patent to create barriers to competitors, and to create the possibility to participate in oligopoly rents that will be generated in the future by potential additional discoveries or incremental innovat there is no guarantee that the inventi secondary market is a highly concentrated one where the value of patents is increasingly ions based on their patents (Levin at al. 1987; Cohen at al. 2000) .
Patents enter into firms' portfolios as a signal of (technological) reputation. Patents acquire a value per-se, independently from that of the subjacent technology and they might be kept dormant in firms' portfolios 39 . The utility of patents goes beyond the appropriability function. The willingness to patent can be assimilated to the decision to buy a lottery ticket. Even though the probability of winning is extremely low, the winning prize or the value assigned by each individual to the eventual win is high enough to encourage the patenting behavior (Scherer 2001; Lamely and Shapiro 2005) . The difference in the current scenario is that uncertainty concerns not only the possibility to win, but also the prize itself. When a firm patents an invention with the idea of engaging in the secondary market, on, i.e., the patent, will reach a certain value in the future.
Moreover, the value of a patent can directly depend upon the value of other patents to which it can be linked through patent-pools, for example. This might contribute to explain why firms carry out extensive patenting strategies even though it is widely acknowledge that patents have a highly skewed value distribution, (i.e. in every technological field there is a limited number of valuable patents and an enormous number patents with much less value). Given high entry barriers determined by risk propensity and high enforcement and legal capacities, the disentangled from the subjacent technology and increasingly related to their potential (future) value.
Production structure specialization, technological capabilities, institutions and legal infrastructure shape participation and exclusion in these new markets for knowledge.
First, in the case of the markets for technologies, developing countries lack production and technological capabilities that would enable them to participate in those markets. It is difficult for them to play the role of specialized technology providers. At the same time, they face serious constraints as demanders of technology, due to production specialization and to scant technological capabilities necessary to decode and productively use patent information. Socioinstitutional factors, infrastructure, and current scientific and technological capabilities strictly shape the arena of production possibilities. Even in an extreme scenario in which all patent information is freely available to developing countries it is unlikely that this would generate increased activity by local manufacturing firms. Typically, industrial and technology policies would be necessary in order to create the incentives for entrepreneurial efforts.
The same discourse applies to the case of the markets for science. Developing countries in general lack scientific and technological capabilities. Beyond legal frameworks, those countries suffer from a chronic deficiency in researchers and quality of infrastructure and systemic environment for science and scientific research. Obviously the current debate regarding proprietary versus open science is of concern for developing countries, but they should avoid blaming patents as the only barrier to their scientific catching-up. Public support for research and development, the recognition of the profession of researchers, capacity building in scientific research and development, and investment in top quality infrastructure for research are more important factors than patent protection for developing countries to play a role in scientific research.
Finally, considering the emerging dynamics of what we have called secondary markets for knowledge and the kind of speculative patenting behavior that is taking place, it is clear that this arena is for the leading innovative actors who recognize and value innovation as a strategic asset for future competitiveness. In these markets the value of patents is increasingly disentangled from the subjacent technology. Hence, production and technological capacities are not seen as major entry barriers, but this means that main barriers here are the capacity and the capability to carry out a strategic management of intellectual property, which stems from and exceeds production and technical capacities. Without those capacities it is difficult to participate in these markets; agents might not even recognize the rationale for them. The explosion of patenting activity deriving from competitive behaviors of agents coping with uncertain future outcomes and extensive patenting may induce a slow-down in the rate of technical change which is already alarming actors in the frontier -consider the self-evident negative consequences of patent thickets in the context of incremental innovations. These issues will be of concern in developing countries as well.
Secondary markets for knowledge in which firms bet on future uncertain outcomes shape firms' patenting behavior. In this context, costs and barriers to entry for new actors (firms and countries) are high, litigation and enforcement costs may be prohibitive, and different forces press towards concentration. Barriers to entry in the secondary market go beyond production and technological capabilities; they derive from firms' risk-propensity and size, as well as the existence of needed complementary markets and institutions to make this secondary market work. Although there are spaces for the entrance of new actors into certain technological trajectories, in developing countries this would not easily happen though market forces.
Concluding reflections on policies and strategic IP management
Many voices in the US have pressed for the perverse dimensions of the new IP and innovation system. Likewise, some rulings have contributed to a slight moderation of the original aims of the pro-patent movement. The relaxing of the patentability criteria has led to a proliferation of patent grants that piqued skeptics who see the counter-innovative incentive potentiality of the patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001 ) and has brought the patent debate into a hypersensitive field, dealing with basic research issues such as health concerns (Rai, 2001) . Preeminent scholars, as well as influential public and private institutions, have tried to introduce some limits to the patenting fury. Among them Nelson (2003) In the countries on the technological frontier, especially the United States, the discussion on intellectual property follows a dual track. On one hand, foreign policy defends the strengthening of intellectual property standards of protection abroad. Weak protection and the asymmetry between the systems of the developed countries and those of the developing countries resemble a systemic fault which prevents the potential disclosure of knowledge and technical progress derived from trade liberalization. Investing and marketing in a context of scarce protection of intellectual property is a risk that few are prepared to take. On the other hand, the debate surrounding domestic concerns is polarized between the powerful groups, (i.e., big corporations in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, as well as the courts), which advocate growing standards of protection, and the academics and civil society, who are concerned about the proliferation of patenting activities and its effect on the long-term innovating capacity of the economic system. At the same time, voices of concern are arising even from the business side, when big firms envisage the possibility of small firms controlling up-and downstream patents, thus increasing their bargaining power.
In developing countries, particularly in Latin America, the inclusion of protection of intellectual property in trade negotiations has brought the topic into political debates. However, In general, the capacity to innovate, though partially the result of a random process concerning something new and unexpected, entails a degree of stickiness shaped by scientific, technological and production capabilities. However, technological dominance is not a permanent feature. History demonstrates that with the right combination of (formal and informal) policies and innovation potential among other assets, a firm or sector can take off. Lack of strategic vision and short-term demands jeopardize learning processes and the development of scientific and technological capabilities, which are localized and gradually built up in a continuous process of trial, error and feedback (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969) .
Ultimately, countries differ in production structures, technological capabilities, development stages, and in the structure of their national systems of innovation (Cimoli and Dosi 1995) . However, the center-periphery relationship between countries with a first class membership in the knowledge club and those who are at the margins also exists within countries.
Structural heterogeneity is, unfortunately, a persistent feature of developing and industrializing countries, where islands of excellence (of foreign or national firms) coexist with the rest of the economy which usually shows extremely low productivity and organizational levels and which is primarily oriented inward. Dual economies require dual policy models in order to orient their industrial development. This also holds true in the intellectual property domain, where developing countries face the challenge of strategically managing IP systems in order to use them as complementary tools in their industrial development strategy.
"Getting the IPRs right" is far from being the solution; there is too much variation in the meaning of right in intellectual property regimes across countries with profound differences in technological and production capacities. Our suggestion is that first, countries should have a clear vision for their industrial development, and second, countries should balance IP regimes in order to cope with the needs of the different segments and stages of their production and scientific structures. Awareness and political will in these fields are the keys for moving forward.
We do not presume in this chapter to propose a solution for the IP and industrial development debate. It would suffice for us to call the attention of those concerned with the innovation for development discourse to the need to avoid converting the patent debate into a much ado about nothing discourse.
The existence of unexploited technological opportunities, together with the relevant knowledge base and a set of appropriability conditions, combine to define the boundaries of the set of potential innovations: those which are actually explored might critically depend on socioeconomic traits of production and organizational systems and on a set of formal and informal policy interventions in support of the generation of certain scientific, technological and production capacities. Considering that technology is highly specific and embedded in routines and procedures, that knowledge has a strong tacit component, and that learning is a trial and error process which entails non-substitutable experiences, those enmeshed in the patent controversy who often blame or bless patents for their effects on innovative conducts are losing their relevance. We hope that our reasoning contributes to an inclusion of intellectual property management in the current renewed discourse on policies and institutions shaping industrial development. Seeking more balanced and tailored IP systems is necessary, and emphasis should be placed both on industrial policies for crating technological and production capabilities and on strategic IP management to uphold the industrial development effort.
